UNU-MERIT Working Papers

Working Paper #2026-007

The cost of bureaucratic fragmentation: Business tax evasion and revenue mobilization in a low-income country

Stephan Dietrich, Yannick Valentin Markhof & Rose Camille Vincent #2026-007 PDF

We provide novel evidence on bureaucratic fragmentation and weak tax administrations as central enablers of low revenue mobilization in low-income countries. In collaboration with the municipal and national tax authorities in Kampala, Uganda, we cross-link previously siloed tax records for 155,000 firms and conduct a large-scale experiment with 60,000 firms. We document pervasive and selective tax evasion: only 14% of verifiably active firms comply with both government tiers. Cross-record linkage almost triples detectable non-compliance while offering increased enforcement efficiency. This coordination dividend is left untapped. Firms exploit the resulting loopholes through partial informality, re-registering under new identities, and strategic late payments. In a cross-authority field experiment, deterrence nudges, including messages signaling inter-authority coordination, fail to offer a lighttouch alternative to addressing fragmentation directly. Our findings establish bureaucratic fragmentation as a distinct and costly source of passive waste in tax administration that existing approaches to revenue mobilization rarely address.

Keywords
  • Taxation
  • Tax evasion
  • Tax administration
  • Low-income countries
  • Nudges
JEL codes
  • H26
  • H20
  • H71
  • C93
  • O12

Cite this as

APA 7th ed.

Dietrich, S., Markhof, Y. V., & Vincent, R. C. (2026). The cost of bureaucratic fragmentation: Business tax evasion and revenue mobilization in a low-income country (UNU-MERIT Working Paper No. 2026-007). UNU-MERIT. https://doi.org/10.53330/QOHL2233

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